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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-3542 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KELVIN L. JONES, 
                    Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-10-00366-001) 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 13, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed: December 12, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
Kelvin Jones appeals his conviction on one count of conspiracy to commit armed 
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), one count of armed robbery in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and one count of conspiracy to 
. 
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transport stolen goods in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.  Jones 
contends that the District Court erred in failing to reopen an evidentiary hearing 
regarding a search of his jail cell before trial, and that the District Court constructively 
amended the firearm charge through its instructions to the jury.  We will affirm.   
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
Jones was arrested and indicted in connection with the February 9, 2010 robbery 
of a Carlstadt, New Jersey perfume warehouse.  Pending trial, Jones was housed in the 
Hudson County Correctional Facility (“HCCC”) with his co-conspirators.  Shortly 
thereafter, the U.S. Attorney’s Office was notified by counsel for one of the co-
conspirators that Jones had passed a note to a co-conspirator, instructing him to attest to a 
statement falsely exculpating Jones of the crime in exchange for payment.  Consequently, 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office contacted Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal 
(“SDUSM”) Wanda Griffin about relocating Jones within the prison.   
On October 14, 2010, Jones’s counsel notified the U.S. Attorney’s Office that 
Jones had been moved to a new cell and that jail officials had searched his cell and 
removed certain documents.  According to Jones, these documents were protected by the 
attorney-client privilege because they contained defense trial strategy.  The U.S. 
Attorney’s Office informed Jones that neither it nor any other federal investigative 
agency was in possession of the documents at issue, and that the government only learned 
of the search from defense counsel’s notification.  
On October 18, 2010, prior to trial, Jones filed a “Motion Seeking Emergent 
Relief,” stating that he was told by jail officials that the search was “at the instruction 
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and/or request of federal agents” and requesting an inquiry into the origins of the search 
and any dissemination of the seized documents.  On October 28, 2010, the District Court 
convened such a hearing, at which the government called two witnesses: Lt. Michael 
Rivera of the HCCC and SDUSM Griffin.  Lt. Rivera testified that Jones’s cell was 
searched pursuant to an administrative policy of the jail and that no federal official had 
requested the search.  Lt. Rivera also testified that one Sgt. Levine was present at the time 
the documents were confiscated.   
Jones testified at the hearing that he heard from ten jail officials that the order to 
search his cell came from one Sgt. Ford, a jail official, who received the order from the 
U.S. Marshal’s office.  Based on all of this testimony, the District Court ruled that there 
was no violation of Jones’s constitutional rights that would warrant further investigation 
into the circumstances of the search and that Jones was “fishing” for grounds.  At trial, a 
jury found Jones guilty of all counts.     
On August 15, 2011, after the verdict but before sentencing, Jones filed a second 
“Motion Seeking Emergent Relief” requesting that the District Court reopen the matter of 
the search of Jones’s cell.  Defense counsel represented that he had spoken with Sgt. 
Levine of HCCC, and that she was available to testify that she was not present at the 
search of Jones’s cell and that Lt. Rivera’s testimony regarding jail-search procedures 
was incorrect.  Counsel requested that the District Court reopen the hearing, require Lt. 
Rivera and Sgt. Ford to testify, and order the government to produce emails between the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office and SDUSM Griffin regarding the search.  Counsel also offered to 
submit to the District Court in camera Jones’ privileged notes for the District Court to 
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compare to government-produced Jencks material and the trial testimony of certain 
witnesses, to show how witness statements changed in anticipation of Jones’ strategies. 
The District Court ruled that there was not a constitutional violation of Jones’s 
rights that would lead it to set aside a jury verdict that was based on “overwhelming 
evidence” against Jones.  The District Court stated that there was not a “scintilla of 
evidence” connecting Jones’s documents to the government, and that Sgt. Levine’s 
testimony contracting other jail officials’ testimony about jail-search procedures was 
insufficient to reopen the hearing.  Jones appealed. 
II.  Discussion 
A. Refusal to Reopen Evidentiary Hearing 
Jones contends that the District Court erred in failing to reopen the October 28 
evidentiary hearing in light of new evidence he obtained regarding HCCC’s procedures 
for searching inmates’ cells.   
We review a District Court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2010).  In order to 
obtain an evidentiary hearing regarding alleged constitutional violations, a defendant 
must demonstrate a “colorable claim” for relief.  United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 
1067 (3d Cir. 1996).  Such a claim requires more than “mere bald-faced allegations of 
misconduct.”  Id.   
 Jones based his request to reopen the evidentiary hearing on alleged discrepancies 
in testimony about the jail’s administrative procedures or lack thereof.  He provided no 
new evidence suggesting that the prosecution obtained or used his privileged documents.  
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This was not a sufficient showing to reopen the evidentiary hearing.  Accordingly, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion to deny the reopening of the evidentiary 
hearing.   
B. Constructive Amendment of Firearm Charge 
Jones also argues that the District Court constructively amended the indictment by 
giving an incorrect jury instruction on the charge of possessing a firearm in furtherance of 
the warehouse robbery.  Jones contends that the District Court erroneously instructed the 
jury that it needed to find that Jones carried a firearm “during and in relation to” the 
robbery, when the District Court should have instructed the jury that it needed to find that 
he carried a firearm “in furtherance” of that crime, in accordance with the indictment.  
Because Jones himself proposed the instruction given by the District Court, the invited 
error doctrine prevents him from challenging on appeal the instruction given to the jury.  
United States v. Holmes, 607 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. West Indies 
Transport, Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 311 (3d Cir. 1997).  We accordingly decline to consider 
whether the instruction effected a constructive amendment.   
III.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.   
